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Truman’s	  Decision	  to	  Use	  the	  Atomic	  Bomb	  Against	  Japan	  in	  WWII	  	   After	  six	  years	  of	  fighting,	  1945	  was	  a	  year	  marked	  by	  several	  culminating	  events	  that	  lead	  to	  the	  end	  of	  World	  War	  II.	  In	  the	  seven	  month	  period	  between	  February	  and	  August	  alone	  were	  some	  of	  the	  most	  significant	  political	  events	  of	  the	  war	  –	  the	  Yalta	  Conference,	  the	  US	  presidential	  switch	  from	  Franklin	  D.	  Roosevelt	  to	  Harry	  Truman,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  European	  war,	  the	  successful	  test	  at	  Trinity,	  the	  Potsdam	  conference,	  Russia’s	  declaration	  of	  war	  on	  Japan,	  and	  the	  dropping	  of	  two	  atomic	  bombs	  –	  one	  on	  Hiroshima	  and	  one	  on	  Nagasaki.	  Although	  looking	  at	  these	  events	  retrospectively	  we	  can	  put	  them	  on	  a	  neat	  timeline,	  the	  overlapping	  and	  fast-­‐paced	  political	  decisions	  near	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  were	  much	  blurrier	  at	  the	  time.	  Looking	  back,	  there	  are	  still	  many	  questions	  we	  have	  about	  Truman’s	  decision	  to	  use	  the	  atomic	  weapons	  against	  Japan,	  and	  these	  questions	  are	  more	  complex	  than	  simply	  whether	  dropping	  the	  bombs	  was	  the	  right	  or	  wrong	  decision.	  Instead,	  we	  ask,	  what	  was	  the	  United	  States’	  true	  motivation	  for	  using	  the	  weapons?	  What	  other	  options	  did	  we	  have?	  And	  was	  the	  decision	  really	  made	  by	  Truman?	  By	  looking	  over	  records	  of	  the	  events	  as	  written	  by	  historians	  and	  comparing	  them	  to	  Truman’s	  and	  Stimson’s	  own	  accounts	  of	  the	  events	  of	  1945,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  Truman	  actually	  had	  little	  involvement	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  to	  use	  the	  atomic	  bombs,	  and	  that	  this	  is	  the	  root	  of	  the	  other	  questions	  we	  still	  ask	  today.	  Our	  motivation	  to	  drop	  the	  atomic	  bombs	  was	  not	  only	  to	  save	  as	  many	  American	  lives	  as	  possible	  as	  Truman	  suggested,	  but	  also	  to	  gain	  post-­‐war	  control	  over	  the	  Far	  East.	  	  In	  addition,	  there	  might	  have	  been	  alternatives	  to	  ending	  the	  war	  that	  did	  not	  involve	  using	  the	  atomic	  bombs,	  but	  Truman	  was	  not	  aware	  of	  these	  options.	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Truman	  was	  uninformed	  about	  a	  great	  deal	  information	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regarding	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  bombs	  was	  still	  to	  an	  extent	  a	  success,	  because	  of	  the	  political	  aims	  it	  achieved	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	   By	  comparing	  outside	  historical	  accounts	  of	  the	  dropping	  of	  the	  atomic	  bombs	  to	  Truman’s	  own	  words	  and	  recollections	  in	  his	  memoir	  and	  letters,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  Truman	  had	  a	  limited	  understanding	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  issues	  surrounding	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  and	  also	  gives	  clues	  as	  to	  why	  his	  recognition	  of	  the	  problem	  was	  so	  restricted.	  In	  reading	  the	  chapter	  in	  Truman’s	  Memoirs	  about	  the	  dropping	  of	  the	  bombs,	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  beginning	  that	  he	  was	  never	  informed	  of	  the	  back-­‐story.	  When	  Truman	  writes,	  “The	  idea	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  had	  been	  suggested	  to	  President	  Roosevelt	  by	  the	  famous	  and	  brilliant	  Dr.	  Albert	  Einstein,	  and	  its	  development	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  a	  vast	  undertaking,”	  it	  is	  disconcerting	  because	  actually,	  the	  bomb	  had	  been	  suggested	  by	  Szilard	  in	  a	  letter	  merely	  signed	  by	  Einstein,	  and	  Einstein’s	  involvement	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  bomb	  was	  very	  limited.1	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  Truman	  made	  this	  mistake	  though,	  given	  the	  background	  explanation	  on	  the	  Manhattan	  Project	  provided	  by	  Stimson	  and	  Groves	  when	  Truman	  became	  President.	  Stimson	  said	  that,	  “I	  went	  to	  explain	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem	  to	  a	  man	  whose	  only	  previous	  knowledge	  of	  our	  activities	  was	  that	  of	  a	  Senator	  who	  had	  loyally	  accepted	  our	  assurance	  that	  the	  matter	  must	  be	  kept	  a	  secret	  from	  him.”2	  This	  explains	  that	  up	  until	  that	  point,	  Truman	  had	  no	  idea	  about	  any	  part	  of	  the	  Manhattan	  Project.	  The	  ensuing	  discussion	  between	  Stimson,	  Groves	  and	  Truman	  should	  have	  cleared	  all	  misunderstandings	  though,	  since	  Stimson	  described	  how	  at	  the	  meeting	  he,	  “…discussed	  with	  [Truman]	  the	  whole	  of	  the	  project.	  We	  had	  with	  us	  General	  Groves,	  who	  explained	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Truman,	  Harry	  S.	  Memoirs:	  1945	  Year	  of	  Decisions.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Da	  Capo	  Press,	  1986.	  Pg.	  417	  2	  Stimson,	  Henry	  Lewis.	  "The	  Decision	  to	  Use	  the	  Bomb."	  Harper's	  Magazine,	  February	  1947.	  Pg.	  5	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detail	  the	  progress	  which	  had	  been	  made	  and	  the	  probable	  future	  course	  of	  the	  work.”3	  However,	  other	  accounts	  of	  this	  session	  depict	  a	  much	  less	  informative	  briefing.	  “[Stimson]	  simply	  tried	  to	  apprise	  Truman	  of	  the	  perils	  and	  the	  opportunities	  presented	  by	  atomic	  energy.	  …The	  meeting	  was	  only	  fifteen	  minutes	  in	  length,	  remarkably	  brief	  considering	  the	  complexity	  and	  importance	  of	  the	  subject.”4	  Therefore	  it	  is	  likely	  that	  even	  though	  Truman	  was	  briefed	  on	  the	  atomic	  project,	  he	  did	  not	  hear	  a	  complete	  enough	  analysis	  to	  understand	  all	  aspects	  that	  would	  play	  into	  the	  decision	  to	  be	  made	  in	  the	  coming	  months.	  	   Another	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  Truman	  did	  not	  have	  a	  grasp	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  bombing	  was	  because	  he	  demonstrates	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  the	  Allied	  agreement	  with	  Russia.	  There	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  evidence	  of	  the	  widespread	  knowledge	  that	  Russia	  fully	  intended	  to	  declare	  war	  on	  Japan.	  Stimson	  knew	  about	  the	  Russian	  intentions	  to	  enter	  the	  war,	  because	  he	  listed	  in	  his	  1947	  article	  that	  one	  of	  the	  “enormously	  favorable	  factors	  on	  our	  side”	  was	  that	  “[Japan]	  has	  against	  her	  not	  only	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  forces	  but	  the	  rising	  forces	  of	  China	  and	  the	  ominous	  threat	  of	  Russia,”	  alluding	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Russia	  would	  rise	  against	  Japan.5	  Stimson’s	  knowledge	  probably	  came	  from	  a	  statement	  made	  by	  Stalin	  at	  the	  Yalta	  Conference	  in	  February	  of	  1945.	  “Mr.	  [Elliott]	  Roosevelt	  writes:	  ‘But	  before	  the	  [Yalta]	  Conference	  broke	  up,	  Stalin	  had	  once	  more	  given	  the	  assurance	  he	  had	  first	  volunteered	  in	  Teheran	  in	  1943:	  that,	  within	  six	  months	  of	  VE	  day,	  the	  Soviets	  would	  have	  declared	  war	  on	  Japan;	  then,	  pausing	  in	  thought,	  he	  had	  revised	  that	  estimate	  from	  six	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Stimson,	  pg.	  5	  4	  Herken,	  Gregg.	  The	  Winning	  Weapon:	  The	  Atomic	  Bomb	  in	  the	  Cold	  War	  1945-­1950.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Alfred	  A.	  Knopf,	  1980.	  Pg.	  15-­‐16	  5	  Stimson,	  pg.	  11	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months	  to	  three	  months.’”6	  Since	  V-­‐E	  Day	  was	  on	  May	  8,	  1945,	  the	  US	  government	  absolutely	  should	  have	  expected	  the	  Russians	  to	  join	  the	  war	  against	  Japan	  sometime	  in	  mid-­‐August.	  Furthermore,	  the	  reasons	  for	  Russia	  holding	  off	  until	  that	  time	  were	  obvious.	  “Russia’s	  policy	  of	  not	  entering	  the	  Japanese	  war	  till	  Germany	  was	  defeated	  was	  not	  only	  military	  common	  sense	  but	  part	  of	  the	  agreed	  Allied	  plan.”7	  Despite	  the	  fact	  that,	  “Stalin	  had	  assured	  the	  President	  on	  the	  first	  day	  of	  the	  Potsdam	  Conference	  that	  Russia	  would	  enter	  the	  war	  against	  Japan	  in	  mid-­‐August,”	  President	  Truman	  still	  expresses	  a	  misunderstanding	  of	  this	  information	  in	  his	  Memoirs.8	  For	  example,	  he	  says	  that,	  “I	  was	  keeping	  a	  close	  watch	  on	  the	  Russian-­‐Chinese	  negotiations.	  …Stalin	  had	  said	  that	  Russia	  would	  not	  come	  into	  the	  war	  against	  Japan	  until	  she	  had	  concluded	  an	  agreement	  with	  China.”9	  However,	  this	  is	  not	  what	  Stalin	  had	  said,	  and	  furthermore,	  it	  leaves	  out	  the	  fact	  that	  Russia	  had	  been	  waiting	  for	  the	  European	  war	  to	  end.	  Truman	  only	  partially	  understands	  the	  reasons	  for	  the	  Russian	  delay.	  The	  real	  surprise,	  however,	  comes	  from	  Truman’s	  own	  description	  of	  his	  reaction	  upon	  finding	  out	  that	  the	  Russians	  decided	  to	  enter	  war	  with	  Japan.	  He	  says:	  	  Without	  warning,	  while	  Russian-­‐Chinese	  negotiations	  were	  still	  far	  from	  agreement,	  Molotov	  sent	  for	  Ambassador	  Harriman	  on	  August	  8	  and	  announced	  to	  him	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  consider	  itself	  at	  war	  with	  Japan	  as	  of	  August	  9.	  This	  move	  did	  not	  surprise	  us.	  Our	  dropping	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  on	  Japan	  had	  forced	  Russia	  to	  reconsider	  her	  position	  in	  the	  Far	  East.	  The	  message	  from	  Harriman	  informing	  me	  of	  this	  sudden	  switch	  by	  the	  Russians	  reached	  me…and	  I	  promptly	  called	  a	  special	  press	  conference.	  …There	  were	  only	  four	  sentences	  to	  my	  announcement:	  ‘I	  have	  a	  simple	  announcement	  to	  make.	  …Russia	  has	  declared	  war	  on	  Japan.	  That	  is	  all.’10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Blackett,	  P.M.S.	  Fear,	  War,	  and	  the	  Bomb.	  New	  York,	  NY:	  Whittlesey	  House,	  McGraw-­‐Hill	  Book	  Company,	  1949.	  Pg.	  131-­‐2	  7	  Blackett,	  pg.	  135	  8	  Herken,	  pg.	  19	  9	  Truman,	  pg.	  425	  10	  Truman,	  pg.	  425	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Although	  Truman	  says	  that,	  “this	  move	  did	  not	  surprise	  us,”	  he	  thinks	  it	  is	  unsurprising	  because	  of	  the	  dropping	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  not	  because	  he	  already	  knew	  Russia	  would	  enter	  the	  war.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  bombing	  of	  Hiroshima	  was	  the	  sole	  reason	  that	  “forced	  Russia	  to	  reconsider	  her	  position	  in	  the	  Far	  East”	  demonstrates	  that	  Truman	  really	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  prior	  Allied	  agreements	  about	  Russia’s	  role	  with	  Japan.	  Furthermore,	  Truman	  refers	  to	  the	  Russian	  declaration	  as	  a	  “sudden	  switch”	  and	  is	  so	  surprised	  by	  the	  news	  that	  he	  calls	  a	  “special	  press	  conference.”	  Given	  the	  information	  available	  to	  him,	  Truman	  should	  not	  have	  found	  Russian’s	  declaration	  on	  August	  8th	  surprising	  or	  seen	  it	  as	  a	  sudden	  switching	  of	  sides.	  Truman	  makes	  it	  even	  more	  clear	  that	  he	  did	  not	  know	  about	  Russia’s	  plans	  to	  fight	  against	  Japan	  by	  his	  recounting	  of	  a	  report	  made	  the	  next	  day	  by	  Ambassador	  Harriman:	  “‘When	  Molotov	  informed	  the	  British	  ambassador	  and	  me	  last	  evening	  that	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  would	  consider	  itself	  in	  a	  state	  of	  war	  with	  Japan	  as	  of	  August	  9	  he	  emphasized	  that…the	  Soviet	  Government	  had	  now	  strictly	  lived	  up	  to	  its	  promise	  to	  enter	  the	  Pacific	  War	  3	  months	  after	  the	  defeat	  of	  Germany.’”11	  Truman	  again	  unintentionally	  shows	  that	  he	  is	  uninformed,	  as	  he	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  know	  that	  the	  three	  months	  is	  referring	  to	  the	  promise	  made	  by	  Stalin	  at	  the	  Yalta	  Conference.	  	   In	  addition	  to	  not	  understanding	  the	  promises	  made	  between	  the	  Allies,	  Truman’s	  missing	  presence	  in	  Washington	  is	  further	  evidence	  that	  he	  was	  not	  fully	  involved	  in	  the	  decision	  to	  drop	  the	  bombs.	  He	  admits	  upon	  returning	  from	  Potsdam	  that,	  “It	  had	  been	  a	  month	  since	  I	  left	  the	  White	  House,	  and	  I	  had	  traveled	  a	  total	  of	  9,346	  miles.”12	  This	  means	  that	  Truman	  had	  been	  gone	  from	  the	  White	  House	  since	  around	  July	  7th,	  so	  that	  for	  all	  of	  the	  major	  events	  in	  July	  and	  early	  August,	  including	  the	  Trinity	  test,	  the	  order	  to	  drop	  the	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bombs,	  and	  the	  bombs	  themselves	  being	  dropped,	  he	  was	  either	  at	  sea	  or	  in	  Potsdam.	  Truman	  recalls,	  “On	  August	  6,	  the	  fourth	  day	  of	  the	  journey	  home	  from	  Potsdam,	  came	  the	  historic	  news	  that	  shook	  the	  world.	  I	  was	  eating	  lunch	  with	  members	  of	  the	  Augusta’s	  crew	  when	  Captain	  Frank	  Graham,	  White	  House	  Map	  Room	  officer,	  handed	  me	  the…message.”13	  The	  fact	  that	  Truman	  was	  journeying	  on	  a	  boat	  instead	  of	  sitting	  in	  his	  office	  at	  the	  White	  House	  shows	  that	  his	  presence	  was	  not	  important	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  bombings,	  especially	  given	  that	  he	  could	  have	  been	  in	  Washington	  sooner	  if	  he	  had	  flown	  home,	  the	  same	  way	  that	  Stimson	  travelled	  to	  and	  from	  Potsdam.	  After	  the	  Trinity	  test	  had	  proved	  successful,	  Truman	  says	  that,	  “Stimson	  flew	  to	  Potsdam	  the	  next	  day	  to	  see	  me	  and	  brought	  with	  him	  the	  full	  details	  of	  the	  test.”14	  It	  seems	  strange	  that	  the	  Secretary	  of	  War	  would	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  fly,	  while	  the	  President	  himself	  must	  take	  the	  slow	  route	  back	  to	  Washington.	  The	  fact	  that	  Truman	  was	  in	  no	  rush	  to	  get	  back	  to	  the	  United	  States	  when	  such	  a	  major	  event	  in	  history	  was	  about	  to	  take	  place	  shows	  how	  insignificant	  Truman’s	  presence	  was	  to	  the	  ordering	  of	  the	  bombs	  being	  dropped	  and	  the	  administration	  following	  through	  with	  the	  pre-­‐assigned	  actions.	  	   Paradoxically,	  Truman’s	  repeated	  insistence	  in	  his	  writing	  that	  he	  is	  the	  one	  who	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  the	  bombs	  emphasizes	  further	  how	  Truman	  was	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  decision.	  He	  reiterates	  that	  he	  was	  the	  one	  to	  make	  the	  decision	  so	  many	  times	  that	  it	  sounds	  unnatural	  and	  as	  though	  he	  needs	  to	  maintain	  his	  authority	  as	  President	  by	  defending	  the	  actions	  that	  were	  carried	  out	  under	  his	  name.	  Not	  only	  does	  he	  stress	  in	  his	  
Memoirs	  that,	  “The	  final	  decision	  of	  where	  and	  when	  to	  use	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  was	  up	  to	  me.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Truman,	  pg.	  421	  14	  Truman,	  pg.	  415	  
Blake	   7	  
Let	  there	  be	  no	  mistake	  about	  it”,	  but	  Truman	  also	  defends	  this	  in	  his	  letters.15	  In	  one	  particular	  letter	  Truman	  responds	  to	  an	  article	  written	  by	  Karl	  T.	  Compton,	  a	  highly	  regarded	  physicist	  who	  had	  served	  on	  the	  Interim	  Committee	  to	  advise	  Truman	  on	  the	  atomic	  bomb.	  He	  wrote,	  “Your	  statement	  in	  The	  Atlantic	  Monthly	  is	  a	  fair	  analysis	  of	  the	  situation	  except	  that	  the	  final	  decision	  had	  to	  be	  made	  by	  the	  President,	  and	  was	  made	  after	  a	  complete	  survey	  of	  the	  whole	  situation	  had	  been	  made.”16	  Even	  though	  Compton	  actually	  had	  more	  of	  a	  say	  in	  the	  final	  decision	  than	  Truman	  did,	  Truman’s	  tone	  in	  this	  letter	  is	  defensive,	  exposing	  a	  need	  to	  confirm	  that	  he	  was	  actually	  the	  one	  who	  made	  the	  final	  decision.	  In	  addition,	  after	  Truman	  sends	  the	  order	  to	  drop	  the	  bomb	  to	  General	  Carl	  Spaatz,	  he	  says,	  “With	  this	  order	  the	  wheels	  were	  set	  in	  motion	  for	  the	  first	  use	  of	  an	  atomic	  weapon	  against	  a	  military	  target.	  I	  had	  made	  the	  decision.	  I	  also	  instructed	  Stimson	  that	  the	  order	  would	  stand	  unless	  I	  notified	  him	  that	  the	  Japanese	  reply	  to	  our	  ultimatum	  was	  acceptable.”17	  It	  is	  interesting	  that	  he	  has	  to	  repeat	  that	  he	  “had	  made	  the	  decision”	  emphasizing	  something	  that	  should	  be	  already	  obvious	  coming	  from	  a	  Presidential	  figure.	  However,	  this	  is	  inconsistent	  juxtaposed	  with	  the	  next	  line,	  which	  basically	  says	  that	  between	  the	  order	  on	  July	  24th	  and	  the	  start	  date	  for	  the	  bombings	  on	  August	  3rd,	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  could	  alter	  the	  order	  would	  be	  Japan	  accepting	  unconditional	  surrender.	  He	  does	  not	  express	  in	  any	  way	  that	  he	  will	  monitor	  current	  events	  or	  international	  affairs	  during	  that	  period	  to	  see	  if	  anything	  else	  comes	  up	  to	  alter	  his	  decision.	  This	  is	  peculiar	  and	  almost	  irresponsible	  for	  a	  man	  who	  in	  the	  sentence	  prior	  was	  just	  asserting	  his	  position	  as	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President	  by	  reaffirming	  that	  it	  was	  he	  who	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  put	  the	  atomic	  bombs	  to	  use.	  	  	   There	  is	  much	  uncertainty	  surrounding	  why	  alternatives	  to	  dropping	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  were	  not	  seriously	  considered,	  and	  the	  fact	  that	  Truman	  was	  not	  a	  powerful	  force	  behind	  the	  decision	  to	  drop	  the	  bombs,	  and	  that	  he	  likely	  did	  not	  know	  of	  these	  possibilities,	  offers	  an	  explanation.	  It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  the	  most	  widely	  known	  possible	  alternatives	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  Truman	  knew,	  because	  options	  known	  to	  Truman	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  reach	  public	  announcement,	  whereas	  ideas	  considered	  by	  the	  Interim	  Committee	  were	  kept	  more	  secretive.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  because	  for	  an	  alternative	  course	  to	  have	  been	  taken,	  there	  would	  have	  had	  to	  be	  pressure	  from	  outside	  of	  the	  government	  to	  counteract	  the	  inside	  decisions	  of	  the	  Interim	  Committee.	  The	  option	  Truman	  seemed	  to	  have	  the	  greatest	  understanding	  of	  was	  the	  possibility	  of	  using	  the	  bomb	  as	  a	  demonstration	  to	  create	  a	  threat	  rather	  than	  to	  drop	  it	  on	  an	  actual	  military	  base	  or	  city	  full	  of	  people.	  On	  this	  topic	  Truman	  says,	  “I	  had	  realized,	  of	  course,	  that	  an	  atomic	  bomb	  explosion	  would	  inflict	  damage	  and	  casualties	  beyond	  imagination.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  scientific	  advisors	  of	  the	  committee	  reported,	  “…we	  see	  no	  acceptable	  alternative	  to	  direct	  military	  use.”…It	  had	  to	  be	  used	  against	  an	  enemy	  target.”18	  Truman	  was	  right	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  feasible	  possibility,	  but	  there	  are	  two	  other	  alternatives	  that	  were	  not	  taken	  under	  consideration	  by	  Truman	  himself	  or	  by	  the	  public.	  	   One	  alternative	  to	  dropping	  the	  bombs	  on	  August	  6th	  and	  9th	  was	  simply	  to	  wait	  until	  a	  later	  date.	  As	  physicist	  and	  World	  War	  II	  military	  strategy	  advisor	  Blackett	  put	  it,	  “Since	  the	  next	  major	  United	  States	  move	  was	  not	  to	  be	  until	  November	  1,	  clearly	  there	  was	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nothing	  in	  the	  Allied	  plan	  of	  campaign	  to	  make	  urgent	  the	  dropping	  of	  the	  first	  bomb	  on	  August	  6	  rather	  than	  any	  time	  in	  the	  next	  two	  months.”19	  Truman	  repeatedly	  says	  in	  his	  letters	  that,	  “My	  object	  is	  to	  save	  as	  many	  American	  lives	  as	  possible”,	  but	  it	  seems	  that	  if	  this	  were	  the	  case,	  then	  it	  would	  be	  in	  Truman’s	  best	  interest	  to	  wait	  until	  closer	  to	  November	  1st,	  especially	  given	  the	  US’s	  knowledge	  of	  Russia’s	  planned	  invasion	  of	  Japan	  as	  well	  as	  tentative	  peace	  negotiations	  between	  Japan	  and	  Russia.20	  Stimson	  says	  that	  as	  of	  July	  1945,	  “It	  was	  known	  to	  us	  that	  [Japan]	  had	  gone	  so	  far	  as	  to	  make	  tentative	  proposals	  to	  the	  Soviet	  Government,	  hoping	  to	  use	  the	  Russians	  as	  mediators	  in	  a	  negotiated	  peace.”21	  This	  being	  said,	  if	  the	  US’s	  only	  goal	  was	  to	  save	  American	  lives,	  and	  there	  was	  not	  going	  to	  be	  another	  major	  loss	  of	  American	  lives	  until	  November	  1st,	  wouldn’t	  the	  US	  be	  willing	  to	  wait	  to	  see	  if	  Russia’s	  invasion	  or	  Japan’s	  peace	  negotiations	  were	  successful	  before	  using	  an	  atomic	  weapon?	  The	  fact	  that	  neither	  Dr.	  Compton	  nor	  Mr.	  Stimson’s	  articles	  “makes	  any	  reference	  in	  detail	  to	  the	  other	  part	  of	  the	  Allied	  plan	  for	  defeating	  Japan;	  that	  is,	  the	  long-­‐planned	  Russian	  campaign	  in	  Manchuria”	  underlines	  that	  Russia	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  US	  felt	  they	  could	  not	  wait	  to	  drop	  the	  atomic	  bomb.22	  Although	  Russia	  was	  an	  ally,	  it	  was	  still	  necessary	  for	  the	  US	  to	  have	  control	  of	  the	  Far	  East	  after	  the	  war	  ended,	  and	  as	  top	  political	  advisors	  knew	  that	  Russia	  would	  be	  entering	  the	  war	  in	  mid-­‐August,	  they	  felt	  the	  need	  to	  beat	  the	  Russians	  to	  control	  over	  Japan	  by	  dropping	  the	  atomic	  weapon.	  Even	  though	  “Japanese	  records	  suggest	  that	  it	  was	  the	  unexpected	  Russian	  invasion	  –	  more	  than	  the	  atomic	  bombings	  –	  which	  compelled	  the	  government’s	  surrender”,	  there	  is	  still	  evidence	  that	  the	  early	  dropping	  of	  the	  bomb	  was	  advantageous	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Blackett,	  pg.	  130	  20	  Merrill,	  pg.	  210	  21	  Stimson,	  pg.	  9	  22	  Blackett,	  pg.	  131	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the	  United	  States.23	  As	  Blackett	  put	  it,	  “The	  hurried	  dropping	  of	  the	  bombs	  on	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki	  was	  a	  brilliant	  success,	  in	  that	  all	  the	  political	  objectives	  were	  fully	  achieved.	  American	  control	  of	  Japan	  is	  complete,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  struggle	  for	  authority	  there	  with	  Russia.”24	  The	  evidence	  still	  stands	  though	  that	  Truman	  did	  not	  understand	  Russia’s	  plans	  to	  enter	  the	  war	  against	  Japan	  in	  mid-­‐August	  and	  that	  Japan	  had	  proposed	  peace	  negotiations	  with	  Russia,	  and	  this	  misunderstanding	  explains	  Truman’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  reason	  for	  the	  bombings	  was	  simply	  to	  save	  as	  many	  American	  lives	  as	  possible.	  Saving	  American	  lives	  was	  not	  the	  main	  reason	  the	  bombs	  were	  dropped;	  rather,	  having	  political	  control	  over	  post-­‐war	  Japan	  was	  more	  significant	  factor.	  	   One	  alternative	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  that	  is	  seldom	  discussed	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  offering	  a	  conditional	  surrender	  to	  Japan	  instead	  of	  insisting	  on	  either	  an	  unconditional	  surrender	  or	  the	  use	  of	  atomic	  weapons.	  Historian	  John	  Chappell	  points	  out	  that,	  “Various	  studies	  have	  judged	  the	  United	  States’	  rigid	  adherence	  to	  unconditional	  surrender	  a	  hindrance	  to	  concluding	  the	  war.”25	  Despite	  pressure	  to	  consider	  conditional	  surrender	  as	  an	  option	  to	  end	  the	  war,	  the	  US	  government	  did	  not	  budge.	  “Immediately	  after	  V-­‐E	  Day,	  requests	  for	  clarification	  of	  surrender	  terms	  appeared	  in	  the	  print	  media”,	  and	  also,	  “In	  June	  1945,	  the	  editors	  of	  Christian	  Century	  printed	  and	  circulated	  a	  petition	  which	  urged	  that	  Truman,	  in	  concert	  with	  the	  Allies,	  make	  a	  proclamation	  of	  terms	  by	  which	  peaceful	  relations	  with	  Japan	  could	  be	  restored…and	  predicted	  that	  it	  would	  contain	  more	  than	  twenty-­‐five	  thousand	  signatures.”26	  These	  widely	  spread	  proposals	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Herken,	  pg.	  21	  24	  Blackett,	  pg.	  137	  25	  Chappell,	  John	  D.	  Before	  the	  Bomb:	  How	  America	  Approached	  the	  End	  of	  the	  Pacific	  War.	  Lexington,	  KY:	  University	  Press	  of	  Kentucky,	  1997.	  Pg.	  116	  26	  Chappell,	  pg.	  117	  and	  pg.	  121	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conditional	  surrender	  in	  the	  press	  contained	  specific	  suggestions	  for	  what	  conditional	  surrender	  could	  include	  that	  would	  still	  satisfy	  the	  American	  people.	  However,	  “Calls	  for	  modifying	  the	  policy	  of	  unconditional	  surrender	  caused	  concern	  within	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  In	  July	  1945,...[Joseph	  Grew]	  warned	  that	  citizens	  must	  avoid	  the	  temptation	  to	  accept	  less	  than	  Japan’s	  unconditional	  surrender.”27	  The	  reason	  the	  United	  States	  did	  not	  want	  to	  settle	  for	  a	  conditional	  surrender	  is	  probably	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  they	  rushed	  the	  dropping	  of	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  –	  for	  assured	  control	  of	  the	  Far	  East	  after	  the	  war.	  An	  unconditional	  surrender	  as	  outlined	  at	  Potsdam	  certainly	  would	  guarantee	  the	  US’s	  position	  abroad.	  However	  it	  seems	  that	  if	  there	  was	  a	  way	  to	  end	  the	  war	  under	  conditional	  terms	  that	  would	  have	  avoided	  the	  use	  of	  a	  weapon	  that	  would	  change	  the	  nature	  of	  war	  forever,	  this	  option	  should	  have	  been	  weighed	  with	  much	  more	  value	  than	  it	  was	  by	  the	  Truman	  administration.	  	   By	  comparing	  the	  information	  we	  have	  today	  about	  what	  actually	  happened	  in	  1945	  versus	  the	  understanding	  that	  President	  Truman	  had	  of	  the	  situation	  at	  the	  time,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  not	  only	  was	  Truman	  misinformed	  of	  the	  complexity	  of	  dropping	  the	  atomic	  bombs	  on	  Japanese	  cities,	  but	  that	  his	  lack	  of	  understanding	  affected	  other	  outcomes	  of	  the	  decision	  to	  use	  the	  bomb,	  such	  as	  the	  motivation	  for	  its	  use	  in	  the	  first	  place	  and	  alternative	  possibilities	  to	  end	  the	  war.	  Truman’s	  simplistic	  understanding	  rooted	  from	  his	  minimal	  briefing	  by	  Stimson	  and	  Groves,	  his	  ignorance	  of	  the	  Allied	  agreement	  with	  Russia,	  his	  being	  away	  from	  the	  White	  House	  during	  the	  height	  of	  World	  War	  II	  events,	  and	  his	  over-­‐emphasis	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  actually	  did	  make	  the	  final	  decision	  to	  drop	  the	  bomb.	  Because	  the	  President,	  the	  head	  figure	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  was	  not	  completely	  knowledgeable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Chappell,	  pg.	  124	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about	  the	  events	  relating	  to	  the	  atomic	  bomb,	  several	  misunderstandings	  arose	  among	  historians,	  scientists,	  and	  the	  public	  alike	  about	  why	  the	  bomb	  was	  used	  on	  a	  city	  instead	  of	  as	  a	  demonstration,	  why	  the	  US	  did	  not	  wait	  to	  use	  it,	  and	  why	  Truman’s	  administration	  chose	  to	  use	  the	  atomic	  bomb	  instead	  of	  considering	  a	  conditional	  surrender	  for	  Japan.	  Whether	  the	  complications	  that	  arose	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  were	  because	  of	  Truman’s	  influence	  or	  if	  they	  were	  bound	  to	  happen	  anyway	  given	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  weapon,	  the	  bombs	  did	  help	  the	  US’s	  position	  in	  the	  Far	  East	  post-­‐war,	  so	  at	  least	  to	  that	  extent,	  the	  ever-­‐ambiguous	  decisions	  made	  regarding	  the	  atomic	  bombings	  of	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki	  had	  some	  positive	  effect.	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